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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Spallation Neutron Source (SNS) is designed to meet the growing need for new tools that will 
deepen our understanding in materials science, life science, chemistry, fundamental and nuclear physics, 
earth and environmental sciences, and engineering sciences. The SNS is an accelerator-based neutron-
scattering facility that when operational will produce an average beam power of 2 MW at a repetition rate 
of 60 Hz. The accelerator complex consists of the front-end systems, which will include an ion source; a 
1-GeV full-energy linear accelerator; a single accumulator ring and its transfer lines; and a liquid mercury 
target. This report documents an as-low-as-reasonably-achievable (ALARA) review of the accumulator 
ring and transfer lines at their early design stage. 
An ALARA working group was formed and conducted a review of the SNS ring and transfer lines at 
the -25% complete design stage to help ensure that ALARA principles are being incorporated into the 
design. The radiological aspects of the SNS design criteria were reviewed against regulatory requirements 
and ALARA principles. Proposed features and measures were then reviewed against the SNS design 
criteria. As part of the overall review, the working group reviewed the design manual; design drawings 
and process and instrumentation diagrams; the environment, safety, and health manual; and other related 
reports and literature. The group also talked with SNS design engineers to obtain explanations of pertinent 
subject matter. 
The ALARA group found that ALARA principles are indeed being incorporated into the early design 
stage. Radiation fields have been characterized, and shielding calculations have been performed. 
Radiological issues are being adequately addressed with regard to equipment selection, access control, 
confinement structure and ventilation, and contamination control. Radiation monitoring instrumentation 
for worker and environment protection are also being consideredCa good practice at this early design 
stage. 
The ring and transfer lines are being designed for hands-on maintenance. The SNS beam loss criteria, 
which determine radiation dose design, are a factor of ~30 lower than the lowest that has been achieved at 
any existing proton synchrotron and accumulator rings. This demonstrates that ALARA considerations 
are an important part of SNS design. 
A noteworthy example of the ALARA principal being incorporated into the SNS is the hybrid ring 
lattice design recently approved by the SNS change control process. The new lattice design increases 
calculated acceptance by about 50% and improves the expected collimator efficiency from 80 to 95%. As 
a result, the expected calculated beam loss rate, and resulting radiation dose rates, are significantly 
improved. 
Another major design change with ALARA implications was the change from an alpha to an omega 
configuration for the high-energy beam transport (HEBT) system, ring, and ring-to-target beam transport 
(RTBT) system. Because of this change, the ring and transfer lines will have crane coverage, eliminating 
the need for personnel to be near activated equipment for repair and removal. By using the crane, 
extensive shielding can be placed around highly radioactive equipment (e.g., collimators), and the 
equipment can be moved by remote control. As part of the change from an alpha to omega configuration, 
the tunnel width was increased by 2 ft. This increased width will allow easier access to failed equipment, 
reducing radiation exposure time to workers during maintenance and repair. In addition, a personnel 
entrance was added to the ring between the HEBT and RTBT so that personnel will not have to enter this 
area directly through the HEBT or RTBT. This addition will shorten the travel distance, and therefore the 
time, that personnel performing maintenance work on radioactive equipment will need to be in the area, 
reducing potential dose. In the RTBT beam line, a hatchway will be placed above the collimators and 
quad doublet magnets near the target to facilitate their removal. This design was chosen in lieu of a track 
system that would require removal of all equipment near the target when replacing collimators or quads. 
This report describes many other examples where ALARA principals have been applied to the SNS 
design. The strongest, clearest indication that ALARA principles are being incorporated into the design is 
 vii 
that knowledgeable, experienced individuals who are conscious of ALARA issues participate at every 
design review and at all levels of design. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Spallation Neutron Source (SNS) is a new accelerator-based neutron-scattering research facility 
under construction in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The SNS will serve the needs of scientists and researchers 
from universities, industry, and private and federal laboratories from the United States and beyond. 
Neutron-based research is becoming an increasingly essential tool in the physical, chemical, and 
biological sciences. To produce the neutrons needed for such research at SNS, an accelerator system will 
be used to deliver short (microsecond) pulses of high-energy protons that will be accumulated in a ring 
and delivered onto a liquid mercury target. The impact of protons onto the neutron-dense mercury Aspalls 
off@ neutrons, which are guided to various specially designed experiment stations. The SNS is scheduled 
to be completed in 2006 at a cost of $1.4B. 
This report documents an as-low-as-reasonably-achievable (ALARA) working group=s review of the 
SNS accumulator ring and transfer lines to ensure that ALARA principals are being incorporated. The 
radiological aspects of the design criteria for normal operations, maintenance, and anticipated upset 
conditions were reviewed against regulatory requirements and ALARA principles. The corresponding 
proposed features or measures for SNS were then reviewed against the design criteria. 
As part of the review, the ring ALARA working group became familiar with key elements of the SNS 
accumulator ring and transport lines and the basis of design for them. The group reviewed the design 
manual; drawings and process and instrumentation diagrams; environment, safety, and health (ES&H) 
manual; and related reports and literature. The group also talked with SNS design engineers to obtain 
explanations of pertinent subject matter. Numerous discussions were also held with SNS personnel from 
Brookhaven National Laboratory, where the primary ring design is being conducted. 
The SNS is designed for hands-on maintenance, as opposed to remote maintenance. This design 
philosophy requires that the average uncontrolled beam loss be limited to ~1 W of beam power per tunnel 
meter. For an accumulator ring with a circumference of 220 m, this corresponds to an average fraction 
beam loss of ~10-4 at 1 GeV beam energy. The lowest achievable beam loss, among existing proton 
synchrotrons and accumulator rings, is about 3 H 10-3 at the Proton Storage Ring at Los Alamos National 
Laboratory (LANL). However, SNS is designed with an estimated beam loss of 10-4. SNS is committed to 
ALARA principles as demonstrated by this low beam loss design criterion.  
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2. DESCRIPTION OF THE SNS SITE, FACILITIES, EQUIPMENT,  
AND RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS 
This section provides a description of the SNS site characteristics and facilities, including the location 
of major buildings and their projected occupancy levels. Descriptions of radiological control policies, 
ALARA organizations, and administration are also included. 
2.1 SITE DESCRIPTION 
The SNS site is located atop Chestnut Ridge on the X-10 portion of the Oak Ridge Reservation 
(ORR), -1.75 miles (2.8 km) northeast from the center of Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). The 
site is accessed via Chestnut Ridge Road, across from the 7000 area at ORNL. The SNS buildings will be 
built on Chestnut Ridge about 1,030 to 1,050 ft above sea level. The footprint for the project extends 
along a long, wide ridge top at the eastern end of Chestnut Ridge. The major buildings needed for the 
operational part of the facility—the linear accelerator (LINAC), transport line, ring, and targetCare 
notched into the south side of the ridge. 
The ORR consists of about 37,000 acres, with three major industrial complexes located in adjacent 
valleys: the K-25 site (East Tennessee Technology Park), the X-10 site (ORNL), and the Y-12 Plant site. 
The ORNL site is about 6 miles southwest of the commercial and population center of the city of Oak 
Ridge and about 23 miles west of the center (downtown) of the city of Knoxville. The location of the SNS 
within the ORR is shown on Fig. 2.1. 
The closest ORR boundary to the SNS site is about 7,500 ft to the northwest on the south side of East 
Fork Ridge. The closest point where private residences can be built (some already exist in this area) is 
about 7,500 ft to the northwest. The general public is allowed routine access to several ORR locations, 
and several unrestricted roads traverse the reservation. The public road closest to the SNS site is Bethel 
Valley, which runs in an east-west direction about 1 mile to the south. Because Bethel Valley Road is 
closer to the SNS site than the ORR boundary and any other locations on the reservation where the public 
is allowed routine access, it is the point where the consequences to the public of short-term airborne 
normal operation and accident releases are evaluated. The point of closest approach on Bethel Valley 
Road is about 4,600 ft (1400 m) to the south of the SNS site. 
Access to ORNL is from Bethel Valley Road to the south and Tennessee State Highway 95, which 
runs in a north-south direction west of ORNL. All access roads that lead directly onto the ORNL site are 
posted and are closed to the general public. ORNL has the authority to control access to Bethel Valley 
Road and Highway 95 in the event of an emergency. 
The average temperatures recorded vary from about 37EF in January to 77EF in July. Temperatures 
above 100EF (105EF maximum) have been experienced from June through September. Temperatures of 
5EF or below (-17EF minimum) have been experienced from November through March. 
The average annual precipitation recorded is about 54 in., with a maximum annual of 76.33 in. and a 
minimum annual of 37.43. The greatest monthly total has been 19.27 in., with a maximum of 7.48 in. 
during a 24-h period. The normal season snowfall recorded at the City of Oak Ridge station is 11.1 in., 
with a single season maximum of 41.4 in. 
The wind direction above the ridge tops and within the valleys at ORNL tends to be aligned with the 
orientation of the valleys. The prevailing wind is from the southwest, with a secondary maximum from 
the northeast during the winter, spring, and summer months. This situation is reversed in the fall, with the 
prevailing wind coming from the northeast. Flow across the valleys is infrequent. The average wind speed 
recorded at the 10 m height on the ORNL Bethel Valley area meteorological tower-2 during the period of 
record from 1984 through 1996 was also 4.4 mph. 
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Surface water at the SNS site consists of a small perennial stream that acts as headwater to White Oak 
Creek. This unnamed tributary flows southeast from the valley below the SNS footprint on Chestnut 
Ridge into the ORNL main plant area. Flow diminishes to zero at the elevation of the proposed SNS site. 
Two additional drainages northeast and southwest of the site dissect the scarp face of Chestnut Ridge and 
flow northwesterly into Bear Creek. While these drainages may receive runoff from the SNS footprint 
area, the footprint does not overlay the actual stream channels. 
The SNS site is not within a floodplain, and widespread flooding is unlikely for a site several hundred 
feet above the valley floor. The site development plans include a basin to retard runoff from graded areas 
during a severe rain event. 
No significant undesired local ponding would occur on the immediate SNS site since the site is 
located on a ridge top and will be graded to preclude undesired water accumulation. A drainage basin will 
be provided to control rainwater drainage from the site. Because of the site=s location atop Chestnut 
Ridge, significant local site flooding is not credible. 
Groundwater at the site is observed at a depth of >60 ft (18 m). Note that groundwater levels vary 
significantly at the site depending on height above the valley floor and seasonal and climatic conditions. 
The hydrology of the ORR has been described by Moore (1989). A detailed environmental 
description is contained in Fitzpatrick (1982) and Boyle et al. (1982). A detailed site description is 
contained in LMER (2000), Fitzpatrick (1982), and Boyle et al. (1982). 
2.2 SNS FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT 
The facilities that comprise the SNS are shown in Fig. 2.2 and are identified in Table 2.1, along with 
the approximate closest distances from other buildings. 
2.2.1 Front-End Systems 
The 2.5-MeV beam from the radio-frequency (rf) quadrupole is transported through the medium-
energy beam transport for matching and injection into the drift-tube LINAC (DTL). 
2.2.2 Linac Systems 
The LINAC receives 2.5 MeV of H! injected from the front-end systems and accelerates the negative 
ions to 1.0 GeV for delivery to the high-energy beam transport (HEBT) system. The LINAC consists of 
three types of rf accelerating structures: the DTL, coupled-cavity DTL (CCDTL), and coupled-cavity 
LINAC (CCL). The DTL operates at 402.5 MHz and accelerates the beam from 2.5 MeV to 20 MeV. The 
remaining lattice structures, the CCDTL and CCL, operate at 805 Hz. The CCDTL takes energy to 95 
MeV, where the transition to CCL takes place. The bulk of the acceleration takes place in the CCL. The 
low-energy component of the CCL (95 to 165 MeV) consists of eight cells per segment, where Asegment@ 
refers to a contiguous section of accelerating cavities between two quadrupole focusing magnets. The 
high-energy component of the CCL (165 Mev to 1 GeV) consists of 10 cells per segment. 
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Table 2.1. SNS facilities and distances 
 
 
 
Approximate separation distance (ft) 
 
 
Facility description 
 
 
LINAC to 
 
 
HEBT to 
 
 
Ring to 
 
Ring-to-target beam 
transport (RTBT) to 
 
 
Target to 
 
Electrical switchyard 
 
250B1,730 
 
1,960 
 
2,000 
 
2,230 
 
2,340 
 
Front-end building 
 
0B1,500 
 
1,750 
 
1,750 
 
2,030 
 
2,100 
 
Outdoor storage yard 
 
230B1,600 
 
1,850 
 
1,900 
 
2,140 
 
2,160 
 
Central utility building and cooling 
    tower area 
 
140B1,150 
 
1,600 
 
1,625 
 
1,870 
 
1,920 
 
LINAC tunnel and klystron building 
 
----- 
 
0B1,560 
 
350B1,750 
 
530B1,810 
 
420B2,200 
 
HEBT 
 
0B1,560 
 
----- 
 
0B325 
 
200B510 
 
420B600 
 
Ring service building 
 
410B1,820 
 
25B360 
 
(25) 
 
25B450 
 
465 
 
Ring 
 
350B1,750 
 
0B325 
 
----- 
 
0B400 
 
390B610 
 
Ring injection dump 
 
460B1,585 
 
350B530 
 
0B250 
 
280B640 
 
660 
 
LINAC dump 
 
250 
 
50B250 
 
175 
 
250B400 
 
360 
 
Ring extraction dump 
 
540 
 
350B530 
 
225 
 
10B380 
 
165 
 
RTBT 
 
530B1,810 
 
200B650 
 
400 
 
----- 
 
0B400 
 
Target 
 
420B2,200 
 
420B600 
 
390B610 
 
0B400 
 
----- 
 
Central lab and office building 
 
1,180B2,630 
 
1,100 
 
950 
 
650B1,040 
 
220B630 
 
Conference center 
 
1,220B2,600 
 
1,200 
 
1,075 
 
680B1,090 
 
390-750 
 
 
2.2.3 Ring and Beam Transport Systems 
The SNS consists of three major ring systems: the HEBT system, the accumulator ring itself, and the 
RTBT system. Three support buildingsCthe HEBT services and support building, the ring support 
building in the center of the ring, and the RTBT support buildingCwill house power supplies, monitoring 
devices, rf equipment, etc., for the major systems. These facilities are shown in Fig. 2.2. The HEBT 
provides the link between the LINAC and the accumulator ring. The beam coming out of the LINAC is a 
1.0-GeV H! beam, with a peak current of 28 mA. The total length of the HEBT line will be 192 m, and 
the total bending angle will be 90E. The line will provide locations for beam scraping of the halo particles 
(i.e., collimators). 
The primary function of the proton accumulator ring is to take a 1-ms, 1.0-GeV H! beam from the 
LINAC and compress it to a 0.5-Fs pulse by accumulating 1,158 turns in the ring. The final beam will 
have 2 H 1014 protons per pulse, meeting the specifications of a 1-MW design average beam power at a 
60-Hz repetition rate. A missing magnet design is used to reduce the dispersion function to zero in the 
straight sections of the ring. 
The RTBT system takes the extracted beam from the ring and transports it to the target. The 
extraction starts with an eight-module kicker magnet array to deflect the circulating beam, followed by a 
Lamberston magnet to bend the beam vertically out of the ring (????). A small dipole magnet brings the 
beam back to a horizontal direction, resulting in a beam height of ~1 ft above the ring beam height. The 
magnet apertures in this line will be sized to allow for malfunctions of one of the eight extraction kicker 
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magnets, protecting the line against excessive beam losses. A beam shape control section will be provided 
for the final beam shape tuning for the target. Additional focusing control will provide compensation for 
the window scattering before the target. The total length of the RTBT line will be 180 m, and the total 
horizontal bend angle will be 15E. 
2.2.4 Target Systems 
 
The target systems primary function is to provide short pulses of low-energy neutrons to neutron- 
scattering instruments. This is achieved through the high-energy spallation reactions from the incoming 
proton beam from the RTBT and the liquid mercury target. A secondary function is to safely contain the 
target material in a system that can transport the proton beam power and resulting radiation to a secondary 
cooling system. 
The target module consists of the mercury target vessel, water-cooled shroud surrounding this vessel, 
and the plug that contains mercury and the water feed and return lines. Target modules are designed to 
handle a reference beam profile that has a width of 200 mm and a height of 70 mm. The peak intensity of 
the beam over this area is #0.18 A/m2. For normal operating conditions, the peak temperature of the 
stainless steel target vessel is maintained at <200EC (392EF). The module extends from the center of the 
target shielding monolith to the inside of the target cell. Because it is directly in line with the proton 
beam, it includes passive shielding provisions, which incorporate dog-legs in the piping to prevent 
generation of excess radiation in the target cell in the event of mercury loss. The modules also include 
wheels to facilitate retraction into the hot cell. Expectations are that the target module will be replaced 
twice a year. Because of the effects of interaction with the proton beam, the target module structure will 
be replaced at least every four operating months. 
The target plug is the structure that spans the region from the target module to the flange that 
interfaces with the process equipment located in the target cell. The target plug contains the feed and 
return lines for the mercury and water systems and shielding. A vertical offset in the plug is provided to 
control neutron streaming through the 5-mm clearance gaps between the plug and the surrounding vessel 
that contains the bulk shielding. The offset also provides shielding in the unlikely event that mercury is 
lost from the piping while the beam is on. A target transport system is provided to facilitate remote 
replacement of the target plug within five 8-hour working shifts. 
The target process systems include the liquid mercury process equipment and water process systems 
used to cool the shroud surrounding the mercury vessel. The mercury flow loop used to feed the target 
and the water flow loop used to cool the shroud surrounding the mercury target are required to transport 
the power deposited in the target module structures. The transport includes removable shielding. This 
equipment includes the mercury pump, heat exchanger, mercury storage tanks, valves, etc. 
The target station includes four moderators to slow spallation neutrons to energy levels needed in 
experiments, beam ports in the biological shield, and beam shutters capable of blocking each of these 
beam ports. The beam ports are large enough to accommodate a range of beam-defining inserts: apertures, 
guides, collimators, and the associated shielding immediately surrounding the beam. These inserts are 
used to define the size and shape of the neutron beam required for specific instruments in the experiment 
systems. 
The target station also includes neutron beam shutters, which are designed to accommodate a wide 
variety of beam-defining inserts. This accommodation is accomplished by providing a large, stepped 
passage through the shutter to be filled by components provided as part of the experimental instrument. 
Some instruments will require guides that pass through the shutters, so the shutters must be capable of 
small rotations about the vertical axis and of vertical and horizontal adjustments necessary to optimize 
guide alignment. 
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2.2.5 Experiment Facilities 
Experimental facilities include the neutron-scattering instruments located on the neutron beam 
radiating from the target station. The target station will provide at least 18 neutron beams, and the 
associated experiment hall is sized to accommodate the neutron-scattering instruments for these beams. 
Most of the neutron-scattering instruments fit entirely within this experiment hall, but a few long-flight-
path instruments will be on beam lines that extend through the walls of the experiment hall. The 
experiment facilities also include facilities to support operation of the instruments. These support facilities 
will include offices, shops, and laboratories that are housed in an experiment support building adjacent to 
the experiment hall. 
2.3 RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS 
SNS personnel exposed to standard industrial hazards will use the same ORNL support organizations, 
controls, and mechanisms as other ORNL organizations. Controls for a wide range of hazards and 
conditions are identified in SNS system requirements documents (SRDs), which also document ORNL’s 
radiological control policies and administrative levels for action. SNS management expectations for 
radiological protection are documented in SNS management and quality assurance plans.  
General rules for training are provided by ORNL directives for training and qualifications. All 
applicable SNS personnel will receive appropriate training on the SRDs. 
SNS is committed to the Integrated Safety Management System precept of continuous improvement. 
SNS intends to continue to improve its management programs, including those for ES&H, and to 
continually search for the most meaningful metrics and indicators for feedback. 
SNS management has developed mechanisms to involve the following three committees in radiation 
safety review activities: the Radiation Safety Committee, ALARA Committee, and the Accelerator Safety 
Review Committee. Effective interaction and communication, including periodic reviews, with these 
committees will help ensure that the SNS is designed, built, and operated according to the highest 
radiation safety standards. 
2.3.1 Radiation Safety Committee 
The Radiation Safety Committee was charged with the responsibility for resolving radiation safety 
issues as they arise during day-to-day design. The chairman of the committee reports to the SNS 
administrative director. Committee membership is listed in Table 2.2. Note that membership will change 
as the project evolves. 
 
Table 2.2. Radiation Safety Committee membership 
 
Name 
 
Title 
Frank Kornegay Chairman 
Paul Wright SNS Personnel Protection System (PPS) 
Jonathan Haire SNS radiological support 
Ken Reece SNS Accelerator Division 
Don Gregory ORNL Operational Safety Services Division (OSSD) 
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2.3.2 ALARA Committee 
The SNS project will have an ALARA committee, which will focus exclusively on radiation dose 
reduction and environmental issues. This committee is currently part of the SNS Radiation Safety 
Committee but will become separate during Title II design. Thus, the committee will be involved early in 
the facility design process and will be consulted routinely regarding design and operational maintenance 
issues. The ALARA committee will perform and documents ALARA reviews of the SNS facilities at 
appropriate design stages. 
2.3.3 ORNL Accelerator Safety Review Committee 
The SNS project is committed to close cooperation with the Accelerator Safety Review Committee 
(ASRC), the standing committee that reviews accelerator safety at ORNL, to ensure that the SNS is 
designed, built, and operated to the highest safety standards. The ASRC conducted an accelerator safety 
review of the SNS in April 1998, near the end of the conceptual design phase of the project. An 
information meeting was held in May 1999. 
2.3.4 ORNL Radiation Protection Involvement 
The OSSD at ORNL has been supporting the SNS project since the conceptual design stage. Subject 
matter experts from OSSD have been providing radiological control advice and have been participating in 
the radiological design review of the project. 
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Boyle, J. W., et al. November 1982. Environmental Analysis of the Operation of Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory (X-10 Site), ORNL-5870, Union Carbide Corporation, Oak Ridge Natl. Lab. 
 
Fitzpatrick, F. C. December 1982. Oak Ridge National Laboratory Site Data for Safety Analysis Reports, 
ORNL/ENG/TM-19, Union Carbide Corporation, Oak Ridge Natl. Lab. 
 
Lockheed Martin Energy Research, Inc (LMER). February 2000. Spallation Neutron Source Preliminary 
Safety Analysis Report, SNS 102030102-ES0001-R00, Lockheed Martin Energy Research, Inc., 
Spallation Neutron Source, Oak Ridge, Tenn. 
 
Moore, G. K. September 1989. Groundwater Parameters and Flow Systems Near Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory, ORNL/TM-11386, Environmental Sciences Division Publication No. 3403, Martin 
Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge Natl. Lab. 
 10 
3. RADIATION PROTECTION DESIGN CRITERIA AND RADIATION LEVEL LIMITS 
ALARA principles have been emphasized during the early design stages of the SNS to minimize 
radiation exposures of workers and the general public. Radiation level limits, selection of areas, and bases 
for shielding requirements had been documented in the NSNS Shielding Policy (LMER 1997). The 
ALARA design criteria were considered in the SNS Design Manual (August 1998) and the SRD (LMER 
1999) for various engineering disciplines. Evaluation of the ALARA design features against SNS design 
criteria is discussed in Section 5. The following two sections summarize the radiation level limits and 
shielding design goals contained in the NSNS Shielding Policy (LMER 1997). 
3.1 SNS GENERAL SITE AREA 
Radiation levels outside the SNS controlled area (see Figs. 3.1 and 3.2) will be sufficiently low such 
that active measures are not necessary to control possible incidental intrusions by members of the general 
public. No fence is needed to control access to the large area that extends out to Bethel Valley or Bear 
Creek Roads. Warning signs near Bethel Valley Road will discourage casual use of the SNS access road. 
An existing warning sign across Bear Creek Road, west of the SNS site, discourages approach by the 
public. 
A dose limit of 10 mrem/year was set for the locations of the warning signs (see first paragraph), or 
along Bethel Valley or Bear Creek Roads, considering all sources of external radiation from SNS 
operations (per year of operation). 
3.2 POSTED AREAS 
A fence will limit access to the controlled area and will surround all buildings with a non-negligible 
radiation hazard. In some cases, the outer wall of a building may serve as part of the fence. Note that 
some buildings (e.g., the administration building) will be the outside of the controlled area but well within 
the site boundary. Ingress and egress through the fenced area will be by card key. Radiation areas within 
the controlled area are defined according to the radiation level inside each area: Radiation Area, High 
Radiation Area, and Very High Radiation Area. Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 835 
(10 CFR 835) provides requirements for posting of and controlling access to each type of radiation area. 
(Note that the area designation may be reduced after accelerator shutdown, as provided by appropriate 
radiological protection procedures.) 
For design considerations, the allowable radiation levels within continuously occupied parts of the 
controlled area will be such that the dose to the maximally exposed worker will be <500 mrem/year. 
Allowable radiation levels within the controlled area must also be consistent with very low dose levels for 
visitors: 100 mrem/year for nonradiological workers and 50 mrem/year for members of the public without 
dosimeters. Shielding design requirements for parts of the facility that do not have occupancy time limits 
and/or special access controls (e.g., higher levels of card key and other control mechanisms and/or 
requirements) are a dose rate of <0.25 mrem/h at accessible exterior surface(s) of shielding with the 
facility operating at its maximum design level. Shielding design requirements for parts of the facility that 
do have time occupancy limits and/or special access and rad-worker training controls might allow 
radiation dose rates above the 0.125 mrem/h design limit. Additional design requirements include 
consideration of ALARA principles and ensuring that worker exposure levels are <1000 mrem/year for 
areas that are not continuously occupied. 
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Shielding design thickness must provide for passive personnel safety assurance in the event of proton 
beam control accidents. The integrated radiation dose at any accessible point in the controlled area outside 
the accelerator shielding shall not exceed 25 rem as a result of the maximum credible beam control 
accident. The corresponding requirement for any member of the public outside the controlled area for the 
same event is a maximum of 1 rem. These quantitative goals are taken from the U.S. Department of 
Energy (DOE) guidance document corresponding to DOE Order 5480.25, the order that has been 
superceded by the current accelerator safety order, DOE O 420.2A, Safety of Accelerator Facilities. (Note 
that similar guidelines may be found in Environmental Protection Agency Manual of Protective Action 
Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, 400-R-92-001, and in DOE G151. 1-1, Volume 2, 
Hazardous Survey and Hazards Assessments, Appendix B.) These guidelines and limits are summarized 
in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. 
Contamination and/or airborne radioactivity areas will be defined within specific areas inside the 
controlled area on an as-needed basis. Access to and surveillance of contamination or radiation areas will 
be controlled by appropriate procedures that implement the requirements of 10 CFR 835. Contamination 
and airborne radioactivity control is beyond the scope of this document. 
Building layout and design must be consistent with ALARA principles, for example, auxiliary 
facilities such as labs, break rooms, and bathrooms should, where possible, be situated in locations with 
very low or negligible radiation levels. 
3.3 REFERENCES 
Lockheed Martin Energy Research, Inc. (LMER). May 1997. NSNS Shielding Policy, NSNS/97-9, 
Lockheed Martin Energy Research, Inc., National Spallation Neutron Source, Oak Ridge, Tenn. 
 
Lockheed Martin Energy Research, Inc. (LMER). September 1999. System Requirements Document for 
the Spallation Neutron Source Ring and Transport Line Conventional Facilities, SNS 108030500-
SR0001-R00, Lockheed Martin Energy Research, Inc., Spallation Neutron Source, Oak Ridge, Tenn. 
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4. PRINCIPAL RADIATION HAZARDS 
This section summarizes radiation dose levels at various key locations. The following are described: 
the source of radiation, general radiation background (i.e., from beam vacuum chamber walls), radiation 
dose near (quadrupole) magnets, dose from collimators, and the dose near beam dumps. Also discussed 
are the time dependence of radiation dose following machine shutdown and induced radioactivity in 
ventilation air and cooling water. 
        
4.1 IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS 
The principal radiation hazards associated with the SNS accumulator ring result from operation with a 
high proton beam flux. These hazards include the following: 
 
$ direct exposure to the primary proton beam, 
$ secondary radiation created by primary beam losses during normal operation or during episodes of 
abnormal beam losses, 
$ residual radiation induced in machine components and in the beam dump during normal operation or 
during episodes of abnormal losses, 
$ activation of cooling water caused by secondary radiation, 
$ activation of the tunnel enclosure and the soil in the earth shielding surrounding the tunnel because of 
secondary radiation, and 
$ activation of air in the tunnel because of secondary radiation. 
4.2 SOURCE TERM AND EARTH BERM SHIELDING 
The SNS design requirement is 1 W/m of uncontrolled beam loss. This requirement corresponds to a 
fractional beam loss of -10-4/m for the 220-m circumference of the ring. The ring and transfer lines have 
general external earth berm shielding of 18 in. of concrete in the tunnel walls and 17 ft of earth berm 
outside the walls. The resulting radiation dose at the surface of the earth berm is 0.085 mrem/h. The 
radiation dose for a maximum credible beam loss event (100% beam loss for a short, <1 sec, period of 
time) is 28 rem/h. 
In addition to the general earth berm, local shielding will be placed inside the tunnel near locations of 
possible higher fractional beam losses. Three mobile local shields are being designed to fit around the 
beam line to provide acceptable dose levels to operating staff should localized higher beam losses occur. 
4.3 INDUCED RADIOACTIVITY 
When a high-energy proton interacts with nuclei of accelerator components, neutrons, protons, pions, 
and other nuclear fragments are emitted, converting the struck nucleus to that of a different isotope, which 
is likely radioactive. Some of the emitted secondary particles may have sufficient energy to cause further 
activation by spallation reactions or by being captured by nearby nuclei, resulting in the production of 
additional radioactive isotopes. Although the overall quantity of radioactivity induced in the accelerator 
depends on the primary beam loss, the probability of producing a particular isotope will depend on the 
composition of the material struck, the spectrum of secondary particles produced, and the interaction 
cross section of the isotope concerned. The amount of a radioactive isotope present at any given time will 
also depend on the isotope half-life, how long the accelerator has been operating, and the time the 
radioisotope has had to decay since accelerator operation stopped. Hence, the complexity of the processes 
governing the amount of radioactivity in the accelerator at any one time makes it difficult to quantify the 
radioactivity in any detail. However, it is necessary to consider the planned beam losses and estimate the 
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magnitude of radiation hazard produced by the induced activity. Induced radioactivity is superimposed on 
activity because of beam loss during accelerator operation and is residual radioactivity that must be 
considered after beam shutdown during accelerator maintenance. 
4.3.1 Residual Radiation in Machine Components 
Ludewig (1999) gives a detailed description of induced radiation in the HEBT, ring, and RTBT 
tunnels. 
4.3.1.1 Vacuum Chamber Wall 
The vacuum chamber walls of the SNS are subject to an average uncontrolled proton loss of 1 W/m 
under normal operating conditions. These lost protons cause spallation reactions in the chamber walls, 
resulting in residual gamma radiation following machine shutdown. This radiation is considered 
background radiation in the HEBT, ring, and RTBT tunnels. 
At an energy of 1 GeV and a chamber diameter of 20 cm, the proton flux implied from a 1-W/m beam 
loss is 9.89 H 105 p/cm2-s. The vacuum chamber is a cylindrical structure with an inner diameter of 20 cm 
and a wall thickness of 1 cm. The chamber is constructed of type 304 stainless steel (9% Ni, 19% Cr, 72% 
Fe). The resulting radiation dose following 180 days of operation is shown in Table 4.2. The data show 
that the dose drops off rapidly with distance and that it falls within the mrem/hour range beyond -50 cm. 
 
 
Table 4.1. Dose as a function of distance from the HEBT, ring, and RTBT 
vacuum chamber following 180 days of operation 
 
Distance 
 
Dose (rem/h) 
 
10 cm (surface) 
 
11.1 
 
41 cm (-1 ft) 
 
5.41 H 10-2 
 
110 cm 
 
6.64 H 10-3 
 
 
4.3.1.2 Quadrupole Magnets 
A more likely situation than an isolated vacuum chamber is a vacuum chamber connected to an 
accelerator component. Such a situation is shown in Fig. 4.1, where beam protons move from left to right. 
Protons scatter out of the vacuum chamber and interact with adjacent magnets, activating them and 
further adding to tunnel background radiation. Gamma sources were determined for volumes of interest 
within the chamber walls and adjacent magnet structure. The estimated doses shown in the figure are 
based on a beam loss rate of 1 W/m of wall length with the accelerator operating for 180 days. 
Figure 4.1 shows that for the radial variation furthest from the magnet (extreme right-hand side), the 
dose at 50 cm is equivalent to the dose at 41 cm for the isolated chamber caseC57 vs 54 mrem/h. Beyond 
50 cm, the radiation dose drop occurs inverse to the radius square. Note that the magnet structure is 
largely self-shielding and that the contribution to the tunnel dose (e.g., at 100 cm radius) is not as large as 
might be thought. 
4.3.1.3 Collimators 
Collimators intentionally capture beam halo protons, causing spallation product generation in the 
collimator structure. Figure 4.2 is a schematic of collimator components. The bulk of the radiation from 
these products will be contained by the collimator structure. However, a fraction of the radiation will leak 
out of the collimator, adding to the background gamma radiation level. 
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Collimators are located in all the transfer line tunnels and the ring tunnel. Two collimators are located 
at the end of the LINAC in the HEBT tunnel, and one is located about halfway around the HEBT tunnel. 
In the ring, three collimators are located in the straight section between injection and ejection straights. 
The RTBT has two collimators located about halfway along the length of the tunnel and one at the end of 
the tunnel just before the target. The collimator in front of the target acts as a shield for the accelerator 
from back-streaming radiation from the target. 
Dose calculations have been made (Ludewig 1999) for a proton beam entering the front of a 
collimator and causing spallation reactions inside the collimator body. The shape of the halo beam was 
assumed to be cylindrical with its highest intensity closest to the inner radius (2.5 cm) and dropping off in 
a step-wise fashion to zero at the outer source radius (4.5 cm). The estimate of proton current was based 
on a beam loss fraction of 10-3 for a machine operating at 2 MW. This implies a current of 2.06 H 10-6 
amps and a machine current of 1.24 H 1013 p/s. The operating period of the machine was assumed to be 
180 days. A gamma source was determined for 27 incremental volumes within the collimator. The source 
corresponding to water-filled volumes was omitted because it is assumed that the collimator will be 
drained during maintenance. 
Under normal operating conditions, the collimator will be shielded by 65 cm of iron in the axial 
directions (both forward and backward) and by 20 cm of iron in the radial direction. This configuration is 
shown in Fig. 4.3. Also shown in the figure is the position of a movable shield placed in the backward 
direction to aid in attenuating the relatively high doses along the beam line. The movable shield could be 
used in the event of maintenance work, which might be necessary for a component downstream of the 
collimator. An 18.5-in.- thick layer of lead is assumed to be representative of the movable shield. To 
compare doses with and without the movable shield being present, two calculations were carried out and 
the dose determined at specific axial and radial positions. These locations are shown numerically on 
Fig. 4.3, together with radial and axial distances. A comparison of the results is shown in Table 4.3. 
4.3.1.4 Beam Dumps 
Beam directed into the injection dump has been estimated to be as much as 10% of beam flux, or 
1.25 H 1015 p/s at 1 Gev. The ring injection dump is copper and is sized at 200 kW, or 10% of beam, to 
handle this loss. This loss gives a peak radiation level of 1.0 mrem/h at the surface of the floor above the 
dump. The injection dump is shielded internally with 144 in. of steel. The radiation dose at the surface of 
the floor above the beam stop is 1 mrem/h, assuming 1015 p/s for the 200-kW beam injection dump and 
374 cm (147 in.) of steel. The SNS design is for 144 in. of steel and 2 ft of concrete above the steel shield. 
This calculation does not consider the further reduction in dose because of the concrete. 
The 33-kW LINAC and extraction beam dumps have the same dimensions of steel shielding as does 
the 200-kW injection beam dump because the shield block dimensions are 52 H 52 H 26 in. The 33-kW 
beam stops are made of steel; therefore, they have correspondingly lower radiation dose levels. 
Beam dumps become highly radioactive, and a beam of radiation will shine backward through the 
beam line into the ring tunnel. This backward shine could be a problem during maintenance, and 
consideration should be given to providing a shutter, or beam plug, to reduce this radiation to workers in 
the ring tunnel. All three beam stops share this feature. 
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Fig. 4.1. Quadrupole magnet with 2-m-long vacuum chamber (dose in rem/hour). 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.2. Schematic of collimator components (horizontal section). 
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Fig. 4.3. Location numbers around shielded collimator. 
 
 
4.3.1.5 Time Dependence of Dose Following Machine Shutdown 
The time dependence of the aforementioned dose levels can be estimated by determining the gamma 
spectrum changes with time as the various radionuclides of interest decay. This change in gamma 
spectrum involves a reduction in the absolute magnitude of the source (photons/s) and a change in the 
energy distribution of the spectrum since the various nuclides that make up the spectrum decay at 
different rates. For irradiated stainless steel, the reduction in magnitude is more important than the change 
in energy distribution. This suggests that for the collimator, magnet, and vacuum chamber calculations 
described previously, the reduction in dose at any location can be estimated by reducing the dose 
determined at shutdown by the fractional change in gamma intensity. The reduction in gamma intensity is 
shown in Table 4.4. 
The previous estimate indicates that after a month the dose will have been reduced to -15% of the 
value at shutdown. The drop-off is relatively rapid in the first day and then slows. 
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Table 4.2. Doses for shielded collimator (standard configuration) 
with and without movable shield 
 
 
 
Dose (rem/h) 
 
Location no. shown in Fig. 4.3 
 
No movable shield 
 
With movable shield 
 
1 
 
9,581 
 
9,586 
 
2 
 
77 
 
--- 
 
3 
 
29 
 
2.0 H 10-3 a 
 
4 
 
4 
 
1.5 H 10-4 a 
 
5 
 
2.2 H 10-3 
 
--- 
 
6 
 
0.13 
 
4.5 H 10-6 a 
 
7 
 
1.1 
 
9.6 H 10-6 a 
 
8 
 
2.1 H 10-3 
 
3.5 H 10-4 a 
 
9 
 
1.8 H 10-3 
 
9.1 H 10-5 a 
 
10 
 
105 
 
106 
 
11 
 
1.4 
 
1.4 
 
12 
 
0.7 
 
0.7 
 
13 
 
0.12 
 
0.12 
 
14 
 
3.2 H 10-5 
 
7.1 H 10-6 
 
15 
 
1.1 H 10-3 
 
1.1 H 10-3 
 
16 
 
7.9 H 10-3 
 
8.6 H 10-3 
 
17 
 
5.7 H 10-5 
 
5.7 H 10-5 
 
18 
 
4.2 H 10-5 
 
5.1 H 10-5 
 
19 
 
8.0 H 10-5 
 
5.6 H 10-5 
 
20 
 
1.4 H 10-3 
 
1.4 H 10-3 
 
21 
 
9.0 H 10-4 
 
9.5 H 10-4 
aBehind movable shield. 
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Table 4.3. Reduction in gamma intensity (and dose) with time following shutdown 
 
Time since shutdown 
 
0 
 
1 h 
 
1 d 
 
7 d 
 
30 d 
 
Fractional change 
 
1.0 
 
---- 
 
0.35 
 
0.22 
 
0.14 
 
 
4.3.2 Induced Activity in Cooling and Fire Protection Water 
Dose levels referenced this section are extrapolated from the advanced gradient synchrotron (AGS) 
Booster Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). 
Radioactivity is also produced directly in the closed cooling water system. Indications are that 7Be 
and 3H are the two long-lived radionuclides that will be produced. Estimates indicate that -50 mCi of 7Be 
and 10 mCi of 3H will be produced annually for a total volume of water in the cooling system of 5 H 105 
cm3. For 3H and 7Be, the concentrations at the end of an annual running period are 2 H 10-2 uCi/cm3 and 1 
H 10-1 uCi/cm3 respectively. Both these concentrations are >5 times the DOE Derived Concentration 
Guides. Radiation monitors in the sanitary waste system will receive ring effluent in the event of an 
inadvertent release. These monitors are designed to divert radioactive water away from the sewage 
treatment plants and filter beds and to a lined holdup pond for additional sampling and treatment, instead 
of direct discharge of the activity. In addition to direct activation of water, slight amounts of radioactivity, 
which have been induced in the magnets, will be picked up in the cooling water. For example, microcurie 
amounts of radionuclides such as 54Mn, 22Na, and 65Zn are expected. 
Cooling water is in a closed, recirculated system. The SNS practice will be to monitor closed system 
or Acontact@ cooling water before discharge. Additionally, the metals content is monitored in both contact 
and Asecondary@ cooling waters. Secondary waters from cooling towers are discharged into recharge 
basins if the metals content is not greater than permitted. Because these waters do not get activated, 
radioactivity is not discharged to the recharge basin. 
Contact cooling water will contain small amounts of short-lived radioactive gases, 15O and l3N. The 
external radiation hazard from circulating these gases with cooling water is momentary, lasting 5 to 10 
minutes after shutdown of the beam. At maximum study intensities on the beam dump, equilibrium levels 
shortly after the onset of beam would be as high as 500 mrem/h at 30 cm from cooling water piping. 
Therefore, beam dump cooling water is circulated only inside the ring and LINAC enclosure, allowing a 
significant decay time to elapse before personnel would be exposed to external radiation from this source. 
It is estimated that the production rate of radioactivity in the 4-in.-diam pipe for fire protection water 
is a factor of -4 less than the magnet cooling water. Sampling of the fire protection water is necessary to 
determine whether any administrative controls are necessary, such as periodic drainage of the system to 
limit buildup. 
Given the production of radioactivity in the fire protection water in the standing wet pipe system, the 
3H and 7Be concentrations at the end of an annual running period will be -l H 10-4 -Ci/cm3 and 6 H 
10-4 uCi/cm3, respectively. These concentrations are above the set point of the sanitary waste radiation 
monitors, which is 1.3 H 10-4 pCi/cm3. Therefore, if this contaminated water were released during a fire, 
the water would be held up before its release. The transit time of water from the ring to the diversion 
pump is about 1 hour, allowing time for notification of a discharge from the sprinkler system. 
4.3.3 Induced Activity in Air 
Dose levels in this section are extrapolated from the AGS Booster FSAR.  
The radionuclides listed in Table 4.1 are produced in the air within the tunnel and assume a total 
volume of air in the enclosure of 3.2 H 103 m3 and that it is recirculated at a flow rate of 1.8 m3/s. For 
energy conservation during accelerator operation, the air is not normally exhausted, but recirculated, 
which allows for decay of short-lived 11C, 13N, and 15O. However, for purposes of this study only, it is 
assumed that the air is completely exhausted, which would be against operating procedure. This gives a 
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maximum bounded estimate of potential environmental release. The release point is from a vent mounted 
on top of the tunnel at a height of 10 m. Assuming uniform mixing in the air volume, the estimated 
concentration of radionuclides at the point of release is shown in Table 4.1. 
 
 
Table 4.4. Air activation during accelerator operation, assuming routine ventilation 
(although though this is not planned) 
 
 
Radionuclide 
 
Production rate 
(nCi/s) 
 
Concentration at release point 
(FCi/cm3) 
 
3H 
 
0.2 
 
1.1 H 10-10 
 
7Be 
 
5.7 
 
3.0 H 10-9 
 
11C 
 
22,000 
 
5.8 H 10-6 
 
13N 
 
49,000 
 
8.4 H 10-6 
 
150 
 
220,000 
 
1.0 H 10-5 
 
41Ar 
 
200 
 
9.0 H 10-8 
 
Total 
 
290,000 
 
2.4 H 10-5 
 
 
 
Immediately after machine operation, the concentration inside the tunnel is similar to the 
concentration at the release point shown in Table 4.1. Inside the tunnel, this concentration translates into 
12 mrem/h for semi-infinite cloud immersion in l3N and 20 mrem/h for immersion in 15O. However, 
because these radioisotopes decay quickly, protective measures for the expected air-induced activity are 
not necessary. Allowing at least a 15-minute delay before entering the tunnel is the procedure. Ring 
operation with no exhaust increases the concentration slightly.    
4.4 REFERENCES 
Ludewig, Hans. October 1999. Preliminary Estimates of Dose following Machine Shutdown from 
Collimators, Vacuum Chamber Walls, and Adjacent Magnets, SNS 106100200-TR0003-R00, 
Lockheed Martin Energy Research, Inc., Spallation Neutron Source Activities at Brookhaven Natl. 
Lab.  
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5. ALARA REVIEW CONSIDERATIONS 
The objective of this review was to verify that the early stage design features of the SNS project are 
consistent with the design criteria in the design manual and that the design features have been set 
according to ALARA principles. This section describes ALARA design considerations identified and/or 
incorporated at the 25% design stage of the SNS project. 
The primary sources of information about design features of the facility were the SNS Design Manual 
(LMER 1998) and the SRD applicable to the accumulator ring and transfer lines. Other sources included 
drawings, SNS reports, technical notes, shielding policy, and meetings with project personnel. 
5.1 CHARACTERIZATION OF RADIATION FIELDS AND POTENTIAL DOSES 
The principal sources of radiation and induced radioactivity associated with the SNS accumulator ring 
operation were identified. Potential doses to workers, both those working in the facility or area covered by 
the project and those working outside or in unrelated areas, have been assessed as appropriate to the stage 
of the design. 
5.2 SHIELDING 
All shielding meets the requirements of DOE regulations and applicable ALARA guidelines 
established for the project. 
The ring has a general external shielding of 18 in. of concrete in the concrete wall and 17 ft of earth 
berm outside the walls. With a design of maximum 1 W/m uncontrolled beam loss, the resulting radiation 
dose at the surface of the beam would be 0.028 mrem/h for 1W/m uncontrolled beam loss, which is well 
below the design goal of 0.125 mrem/h. In addition to the general earth berm, there will be local shielding 
inside the ring tunnel near locations of possible higher fractional beam losses. Mobile shields have been 
designed to fit around the beam line to provide acceptable dose levels to operating staff should higher 
beam losses occur. Shielding calculations for collimators have also been carried out. 
Temporary or local shielding has been considered in allotting access space. Shields of a size and 
thickness sufficient to meet occupancy requirements outside them are based on conservative source, use, 
occupancy, and layout assumptions. The selected shield materials are appropriate for all types of radiation 
that they are to shield against. Labyrinths, labyrinth roofs, shield doors, and shield plugs or hatches have 
been included in the design as appropriate. 
Currently, the only planned local shielding is for the collimators. None is currently planned, for 
example, for the injection and ejection septum magnet areas. Although the dimension and mechanical 
designs of the collimators are essentially the same, the radiation dose from them varies depending on 
function. A first estimate is that the collimators in the HEBT are -1/10 those in the ring, those in the 
RTBT are -1/100 those in the ring, and those next to the target are about equal to those in the ring. There 
is a movable scatterer in front of the collimators in the ring. Although the function of the scatterer is to 
make the collimators more efficient in stopping the halo, it may be a new source of neutrons. 
Movable shields in the tunnel for magnet maintenance work will be useful in reducing worker dose. 
Movable shields and special tools (e.g., remotely handled tool) for the alignment workers are important 
since these workers usually get the highest dose. 
The shielding requirements caused by water activation need to be examined. Be-7 is a spallation 
product of water. Be-7 has a 54-day half-life and -0.5 MeV of gamma radiation. For example, some of 
the issues that need to be resolved are whether the water-cooling lines for the collimators in the ring 
service building need shielding and whether the water coolant in the mercury target window needs 
shielding. Shielding for cooling water lines also needs closer examination. 
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More than 30 ft of earth will separate the Ring Service Building from the ring, providing adequate 
bulk shielding. However, the radiation dose rate, from penetrations and activated cooling water, has not 
yet been examined at this early stage of Title I design. 
5.3 EQUIPMENT SELECTION 
A study was conducted on improving the machine lattice and the design performance of the ring. A 
design change request based on this study was presented to SNS management and was endorsed by the 
SNS Change Control Board. The new ring lattice improves the maintainability and flexibility of the 
machine. The new ring hybrid lattice design is expected to have lower fractional beam loss rate (10e-4, 
which is the design level for the ring) than the earlier focus zero defocus zero (FODO) lattice design 
(10e-3) because of increased beam acceptance and improved collimator efficiency. 
In the RTBT beam line, a hatchway is placed above the collimators and quad doublet magnets near 
the target to facilitate their removal. This design is in lieu of a railroad track system that would require 
removal of all equipment near the target when replacing collimators or quads. 
The omega HEBT, ring, and RTBT configuration now has crane coverage. This coverage will 
eliminate the need for personnel to be near activated equipment for repair and removal, resulting in less 
potential radiation exposure to workers. Overhead cranes have proven useful in keeping maintenance 
doses low and in moving items around when the aisles are not clear. Some components were designed to 
be lifted out of place and movedCwith their shieldingCto a low background area. This will help reduce 
dose during maintenance by minimizing the time spent in the high background area. Cranes, monorails, 
forklifts, transfer carts, etc., will have a clear path to the point of laydown. 
Cap-on insulators will be used for magnet coils to lower magnet failures and, hence, require less 
maintenance work, reducing potential worker dose. These insulators cost -$500 per coil for 270 magnets 
with two coils each. 
The proton beam in the ring needs to be clean of extraneous particles so as not to activate the ejection 
kicker magnets and septum magnet. A Agap kicker@ is needed and is present in the baseline design. 
To reduce exposure to repair technicians, the magnet service building needs to include a high bay area 
with a crane for lifting heavy (radioactive) loads. 
A number of experimental programs are under way, which will result in lower radiation exposures: 
 
$ Several epoxies for magnet conductors are being tested for breakdown in a gamma ray irradiation 
facility at Sandia. Lower failure rates will reduce worker exposures for repair and replacement. 
$ Testing similar to that for item 1 will also be conducted for insulation for magnets. 
$ A prototype septum injection magnet is being built and will be installed in the AGS to get experience 
and quantify radiation dose rates. 
5.4 ACCESS CONTROL 
The design basis was evaluated for the access control system, the radiation containment system, and 
the interrelated elements for these two systems (as well as the interlock network). The access control 
system includes beam stoppers, barriers, and an entry module at every entrance. The radiation monitoring 
system includes power limiting devices, shielding, dumps, collimators, etc. 
The design of the PPS, as described in the SNS Design Manual, is based on SNS personnel's 
understanding of the Abest available technology@ being used at relatively new, comparable accelerator 
facilities. Project plans are to evaluate the use of programmable logic controllers (PLCs) as part of Title I 
design activities. The evaluation will address both reliability and cost-effectiveness issues. It is expected 
that because of system size and complexity, accelerator personnel protection functions will be 
implemented via PLCs. However, target and instrument personnel protection functions may be small and 
simple enough that a relay-based system would be more cost effective. Where PLCs are judged to offer 
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the best solution, a basic reliability analysis will be performed to verify that such a system would provide 
the required reliability. 
Risk evaluations are being performed to evaluate PPS design adequacy and worker safety and to 
focus attention on where system improvements can provide cost-effective risk reduction. The 1998 ASRC 
review recommended an early analysis by the project of the various levels of access control mapping into 
the floor plan of the facility. The project intends to accomplish this during Title I design. 
Detectors will be installed at barriers that restrict personnel access to the tunnel during accelerator 
operations. Radiation detectors (ion chambers) capable of beam cutoff would also be installed at locations 
where disoperation of the accelerator could cause an unacceptable radiation dose. This system is designed 
to protect workers from prompt radiation. 
A personnel entrance was added to the ring between the HEBT and RTBT so that staff will not have 
to enter this region from the HEBT or RTBT. This will shorten the time that personnel will have to 
perform maintenance on highly radioactive equipment in this area, reducing potential dose. 
5.5 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION 
ALARA application of the radiation monitoring instrumentation was reviewed with respect to the 
assumed radiation types and intensities, the nature of the facility, the need for redundancy, and the 
assumed normal and emergency operating conditions. This system is to protect workers from residual 
radiation. 
“Chipmunks” are planned for use as radiation safety detectors at the SNS accelerator facilities. 
Another device being considered for detecting beam loss is a long (up to 25 ft) gas-flow ion chamber 
made from a section of air-insulated coax (e-mail from Gregory to Wright on SNS radiation protection 
instrumentation, May 7, 1999). 
Gamma and neutron dosimeters will be used for both personnel and area monitoring purposes. 
Locations discussed for area monitoring were the klystron rooms, outside on top of the berms, at the fence 
line, and in the experimental areas (e-mail from Gregory to Wright on SNS radiation protection 
instrumentation, May 7, 1999). 
Electronic alarming dosimeters, dosimeter readers, and access control stations will be installed at each 
controlled tunnel entrance. Automated radiological work permits (RWPs) would be highly desirable. The 
number of tunnel entrances that will use automated RWPs (LINAC, ring, and connecting tunnels) appears 
to be seven currently, and there will probably be two more restricted areas in the target basement that 
could also use an automated RWP system. Fixed outdoor gamma-neutron monitors and movable indoor 
gamma-neutron monitors will be used for area monitoring. The need for automated friskers (hand-and-
foot monitors) should be evaluated for worker protection (e-mail from Gregory to Wright on SNS 
radiation protection instrumentation, May 7, 1999). 
Real-time area monitors for outdoor use were also considered. The plan is that these monitors would 
indicate increased gamma and neutron fields outside the tunnel and ring berms in case a misdirected beam 
creates an undesirable field (not an emergency but a field that is higher than acceptable) outside the 
shielding. The misdirected beam would not, for some reason, be noticed either by the equipment-
protection radiation detectors (as increased radiation in the tunnels) or by beam monitors (as lost beam). 
These outdoor units would be located near the LINAC tuning dump and east and south of the ring. The 
need for radiation stack monitoring and water sampling and monitoring is also being evaluated based on 
potential releases (e-mail from Gregory to Wright on SNS radiation protection instrumentation, May 7, 
1999). 
Brookhaven National Laboratory=s (BNL’s) experience indicated that stationary radiation detection 
instrument locations are based on surveys taken as the beam is being commissioned. Estimated positions 
are considered as design changes are planned, but actual placement is ultimately based on surveys. Low-
intensity beams are tuned through the apparatus, and then deliberate Afailures@ are created for evaluation 
purposes. BNL has found this to be the most effective method of predicting proper instrument positioning 
and expected radiation levels. 
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5.6 CONFINEMENT STRUCTURE AND VENTILATION SYSTEM 
The ventilation system design was reviewed against the required level of protection from airborne 
radioactivity, with particular attention to airflow patterns and locations of air inlets and exhausts. The 
exhaust system designed for the ring and transport lines has the makeup air inlet at the beginning of the 
HEBT and the exhaust at the end of the RTBT. There is a shielded wall between the end of the RTBT and 
the target. Most mechanical and piping systems for ventilation are installed underground. The makeup air 
and exhaust system will be turned off during operation of the accelerator and for a duration of 30 to 60 
minutes afterward (duration based on monitoring of tunnel air quality and reduction of radioactivity 
levels). After the waiting period, the system will operate until reactivation of the accelerator. 
Intake air is filtered to minimize dust accumulation in radiological areas and to exhaust filter loading. 
Welded seams will be used in ductwork carrying contaminated air. 
The SNS central exhaust system will convey exhaust air from the tunnels, beam dumps, and Target 
Building to the central exhaust stack. Various ALARA design considerations are described in the SNS 
site utilities design. Ventilation velocity will be high enough to prevent particulate fallout within the 
ducts. Duct material will be butt-welded polyethylene pipe. This nonmetallic material is proposed for 
longevity and will require less maintenance. Wherever possible, butt welds or freeze fits will be used 
instead of socket welds for piping connections; this is also an ALARA practice. The exhaust stack will be 
located to the south of the ring tunnel. This location is central to intake points, with the consideration that 
it will minimize tunnel crossings. 
Exhaust points will be coordinated with makeup air injection points to fully flush all areas. The 
design will also ensure that exhaust streams are from areas of lower potential activation to areas of higher 
potential activation. Each exhaust and makeup air connection to a tunnel will incorporate a 90E bend near 
the point of connection to minimize radiation streaming. Exhaust fans serving the tunnels will be 
separated from other systems. This will minimize potential for any cross contamination. All ductwork 
within the fan building will be welded stainless steel construction with flanged joints where required. The 
use of flange provides quick removal considering contamination buildup. All exhaust systems will be 
provided with redundant fan units and will be supplied from the emergency power system. It is proposed 
that all fan systems will run continuously, using variable frequency drives to fan capacity control, thus 
maintaining a constant negative static pressure in the exhaust ductwork. 
Ventilation for the ring service building is separate from the ring ventilation and will be part of a local 
ventilation system. 
Currently, there are no plans for local ventilation systems (except for local ventilation of smoke 
exhaust) to control localized airborne contaminants. The design approach is to keep the airborne potential 
to minimum and hence eliminate the need for local ventilation. The reviewers believe that when operating 
a beam dump area for example, it may become necessary to extract radioactive air to maintain a slight 
underpressure before entry can be allowed. 
5.7 CONTAMINATION CONTROLS AND DECONTAMINATION AND DECOMMISSIONING 
It is expected that no significant contamination will be present on the surface of the equipment. It is 
also expected that the design of the facility will require minimal maintenance, reducing the potential for 
internal and external dose to personnel and for contamination of the facility. However, it is possible that 
some surface contamination will occur as a result of a misdirected beam (scrapping), causing activated 
metal surfaces to become oxidized. Also, it is possible that some leakage could occur if a component is 
degraded or fails. Thus, testing for contamination should be conducted before maintenance. Locations that 
should be checked for potential contamination will be identified at later detailed design stages. 
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All tunnel internal wall surfaces will be coated with epoxy to minimize erosion and the buildup of 
radioactivity and for ease of decontamination. Other surfaces made of nonporous material will be coated, 
or sealed, for ease of decontamination. 
Suitable lubricants, geometries, and filters have been considered for minimizing the production and 
transport of particles to areas where they might become activated. 
The reviewers concluded that design features to control contamination and to decontaminate are 
adequate at this stage of design. Provisions have also been considered to ease decommissioning, as 
appropriate, at this stage of design. Besides ventilation features and equipment selection, features such as 
decontamination enclosures, coatings, and personnel contamination monitors were studied. Radioactive 
waste production, storage, and movement were also considered. 
5.8 REFERENCES 
Lockheed Martin Energy Research, Inc (LMER). September 1998. Spallation Neutron Source Design 
Manual, Chapter 5, ARing and Transfer Lines,@ Lockheed Martin Energy Research, Inc, Spallation 
Neutron Source, Oak Ridge, Tenn. 
 
UT-Battelle. August 2000. SNS Site Utilities 90% Design Package Title I Calculations, (task number: 
99f-18314-1), SNS 108040000-CA-0001-R00, UT-Battelle, LLC, Spallation Neutron Source, Oak Ridge, 
Tenn. 
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6. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study found that ALARA principles are being incorporated into the SNS design. To 
demonstrate the application of ALARA principles, various radiological control features have been 
incorporated or considered at the 25% design stage for the SNS ring and transfer lines. The following 
ring design decisions that impact the ALARA principals were identified during this evaluation: 
 
$ The new ring hybrid lattice design will have lower beam loss than the FODO lattice design because of 
increased beam acceptance. 
 
$ The omega HEBT, ring, and RTBT configuration now has crane coverage, eliminating the need for 
personnel to be near activated equipment for repair and removal. This will result in less potential 
radiation exposure to workers. 
 
$ The tunnel width was increased by 2 ft during the change to the omega configuration. This will result 
in less confined areas in which to work, reducing radiation exposure dose to workers. 
 
$ Features such as Aquick disconnects@ of electrical lines and piping are being incorporated into the 
design to reduce maintenance times, and hence dose levels, for maintenance personnel. 
 
$ A personnel entrance was added to the ring between the HEBT and RTBT so that personnel will not 
to have to enter this region from the HEBT or RTBT. This will shorten the time that personnel will 
need to perform maintenance work on highly radioactive equipment in this area, reducing potential 
dose to workers. 
 
$ In the RTBT beam line, a hatchway will be placed above the collimators and quad doublet magnets 
will be placed near the target to facilitate their removal. This design is in lieu of a railroad track 
system that would require removal of all equipment near the target when replacing collimators or 
quads. 
 
$ A cap-on insulator will be used for magnet coils to lower magnet failures; this will require less 
maintenance work and hence reduce worker dose. These insulators cost -$500 per coil for 270 
magnets with two coils each. 
 
$ A number of experimental programs are under way in support of ALARA principals: (1) several 
epoxys for magnet conductors are being tested for breakdown in a gamma ray irradiation facility at 
Sandia. Lower failure rates will reduce worker exposures for repair and replacement; (2) testing 
similar to that in item 1 will also be conducted for insulation for magnets; (3) a prototype septum 
injection magnet is being built and will be installed in AGS to get experience and quantify radiation 
dose rates; and (4) the AGS has extensive experience with the design and manufacture of radiation-
resistant beam line elements. 
 
$ Several movable radiation shields are being designed for use in the tunnel for magnets maintenance 
work. These will reduce the radiation dose to workers. 
 
$ Special tools (e.g., remotely handled tools for beam alignment workers) are being designed. These 
will also reduce the radiation dose to workers. 
 
Further ALARA design considerations for various engineering disciplines are listed in Appendix A 
in the form of questionnaires. These ALARA considerations can assist engineers in incorporating 
ALARA principles into future design processes. 
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APPENDIX A: ALARA DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
This appendix lists other ALARA considerations that were addressed during discussion with SNS 
designers but that are not specifically identified in Section 5. These questions can assist engineers in 
incorporating ALARA principles in future design processes. 
A.1 RADIATION SHIELDING 
  1. Have penetrations been sized and located to minimize radiation streaming? 
 
  2. Have penetrations in shielding walls been located and oriented so that accessible areas or radiation-
sensitive components are not in the streaming path? 
 
  3. Has streaming through penetrations for piping, conduit, ducts, etc., been reduced where appropriate 
by using shadow shields or shield plugs or by filling the void space in these penetrations? 
 
  4. Has local shielding been considered where possible (e.g., temporary shielding, shadow shielding, 
shield caps and covers)? 
 
  5. Where appropriate, are walls, ceilings, pipe hangers, and components designed to support 
temporary shielding? 
 
  6. If shielding is impractical, can distance be used to reduce exposure? 
 
  7. Are pieces of equipment that could produce high dose rates or contamination levels separated by 
shielding and distance from (a) each other, (b) equipment producing low dose rates, and (c) general 
access areas? 
 
  8. If piping, conduit, or ducts that pass through a room could cause a high dose rate in the room when 
access is required, has relocation or shielding been considered? 
 
  9. Has consideration been given to routing pipes, conduits, and ducts through labyrinths, locating 
radioactive pipes or other components behind columns, and embedding radioactive pipes in floors 
where appropriate? 
 
10. Has consideration been given to skid-mounted systems with shielding or to adequate space for 
additional shielding to separate high-dose-rate-producing components from each other and from 
other radioactive components? 
A.2 EQUIPMENT SELECTION 
  1. Where material might become activated, are corrosion-resistant materials and materials with low 
activation potential used as much as possible? 
 
  2. Are manual valve operators used only for infrequently operated valves or for those handling only 
low levels of radioactivity? 
 
  3. Are instruments and controls testable, with convenient connections provided for all required tests? 
 
 A-3 
  4. Do the instruments selected contain the minimum amounts of fluid that could to become 
contaminated? 
 
  5. Are local indicators designed and located to be readable from the entry or outside of the 
corresponding high-dose-rate cubicle or area, perhaps by the use of mirrors or shield windows? 
 
  6. Is this an application that would justify the use of a leaded-glass window, closed-circuit TV system 
(or the like), or provision for their addition in the future? 
 
  7. Are vertical and straight heat exchangers used instead of horizontal or U-tube types (i.e., it is best 
not to have the contaminated fluid on the tube side)? 
 
  8. Are passive pieces of equipment that require little maintenance placed in the least accessible areas 
and separated by shielding from equipment placed in the most accessible areas and that requires 
frequent maintenance? 
A.3  ACCESS CONTROL (SPECIAL RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS, ALARMS, 
 INTERLOCK, ETC., ACCESSIBILITY DURING AND FOLLOWING ACCIDENTS) 
  1. Have the contained, contamination, and airborne source radioactivities for the area been determined 
for the relevant normal, shutdown, and abnormal conditions? 
 
  2. Have radiological area designations appropriate for the expected dose rates, contamination levels, 
and occupancies been specified? 
 
  3. Has access control of areas, rooms, or buildings appropriate for their intended use been provided for 
in their design or modification? 
 
  4. Has appropriate access control during construction or modification of areas, rooms, or buildings 
been considered? 
 
  5. For inside and outside areas, rooms, and buildings, has consideration been given to delivery routes 
and loading or delivery areas? 
 
  6. Has positive physical control been provided as required for each type of radiological area? 
 
A.4 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION 
  1. Are sampler, sample flow, and sampling line characteristics matched to the parameter(s) to be 
measured and to the physical characteristics of the source stream or volume to be measured? 
 
  2. Are sample probes placed in a location where sampling is isokinetic (if required) and upstream of 
filters (where applicable)? 
 
  3. Are sample probes in liquid streams located in a suitable flow region of the stream? 
 
  4. Are sampling systems designed for appropriate purge flow for quick, accurate samples? 
 
  5. Can sampling of high-activity streams or volumes be done remotely? 
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  6. Where appropriate, do hoods at sample stations or sinks operate automatically when samples are 
being taken? 
 
  7. Are samples (where applicable), overflows, and flush water or gas directed to drains or collectors 
and returned to the sampled system at some appropriate point or to the rad waste system? 
 
  8. Are air samples returned to an appropriate duct upstream of heating, ventilation, and air 
conditioning cleanup filters? 
 
  9. Are local sampling points minimized, with as many samples as possible routed to local sampling 
stations? 
 
10. Are off-line process, effluent, and airborne monitor and sampler lines made as short as possible and 
heat-traced as necessary to minimize sampler line loss, water condensation, and radioactivity 
buildup? 
 
11. Are monitor and sampler lines and chambers made of nonreactive materials, where appropriate, to 
avoid radioactivity buildup that might interfere with the proper functioning of the sensor? 
 
12. Will a proposed modification of an area or system served by a radiation monitoring system be 
designed to have an insignificant effect on the performance characteristics, set points, or location of 
the constituent monitors or related process devices? 
 
13. Will a proposed modification of a radiation monitoring system retain the performance 
characteristics, set points, or location of each of its constituent monitors or related process devices? 
 
14. Are area radiation and airborne activity monitors provided for each area and effluent and process 
monitors provided for each waste stream as appropriate? 
 
15. Are process and effluent monitors located to adequately monitor for the conditions they are 
designed for and to provide enough lead time for isolation or diversion of their process streams, if 
necessary? 
 
16. Have portal monitors, friskers, sorting monitors, etc., been located in low-background areas or 
shielded as necessary? 
 
17. Do monitors have both local and remote readouts and alarms where appropriate? 
 
18. Can the readout of each monitoring system be recorded? 
 
19. Does each instrument have ranges and sensitivity sufficient to ensure readout of the highest and 
lowest levels of activity, including accident conditions where applicable, and is the response time 
adequate for its function? 
 
20. Is each monitor or monitoring system provided with a means to indicate component failure? 
 
21. Are circuits and monitors built with fail-safe or backup capabilities? 
 
22. Are monitors capable of being quickly and easily calibrated and tested, whether on the spot, 
remotely, or in some other location? 
 
23. Are monitors qualified for the expected life doses at their locations? 
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A.5 CONFINEMENT STRUCTURE AND VENTILATION SYSTEM 
  1. Has the air sampling design been verified as adequate for its intended purpose? 
 
  2. Is ventilation flow sufficient to keep airborne radioactivity concentrations below prescribed levels? 
 
  3. Have penetrations, gratings, construction openings, etc., been evaluated for proper placement and 
sealing when open to areas of potential airborne activity? 
 
  4. Are connections and thermal expansion loops on piping placed above the centerline? 
A.6 DECONTAMINATION AND DECOMMISSIONING 
  1. Are pipe bends with a radius of 5 pipe diameters or greater used? 
 
  2. Are low points, dead legs, and flow restrictions avoided wherever possible? 
 
  3. Are there filters upstream and strainers downstream of demineralizers for the water collection 
system? 
 
  4. Can radioactive waste shipping containers be readily retrieved and loaded for shipment? 
A.7 ALARA FEATURES IN GENERAL 
  1. Are systems designed for ease of maintenance, consistent with ease of inspection and operations? 
 
  2. Have maintenance requirements of systems and equipment been considered in their selection and 
location? 
 
  3. Have the life expectancy and reliability of systems and equipment been considered in their selection 
and location? 
 
  4. Have systems and equipment using radiation-resistant and environmentally resistant materials been 
selected where applicable? 
 
  5. Have valves been selected for low-leakage, low-maintenance, and low radioactivity accumulation 
properties? 
 
  6. Are similar components that require service or replacement and that may be used throughout the 
facility standardized where appropriate? 
 
  7. Is modular design used wherever possible (for temporary shielding, shield plugs, snap-on 
insulation, etc.)? 
 
  8. Where possible, are removal and installation of highly radioactive replaceable components, 
draining, flushing, sampling, remote survey of rad waste drums, etc., done remotely? 
 
  9. Are seals flushed, pump casings and other equipment drained, and tanks and other equipment 
decontaminated, as appropriate, before maintenance? 
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10. Where appropriate for the use, are canned pumps used in the system, and can all pumps be 
maintained without removing their motors? 
 
11. Are quick electrical, mechanical, or hydraulic release mechanisms used where possible for 
insulation, sample bombs, electrical connections, even entire skids, etc.? 
 
12. Are flanges rather than welds used for quick removal where appropriate considering contamination 
buildup? 
 
13. Is equipment provided with lifting lugs to reduce rigging time? 
 
14. Has the use of special tools to facilitate maintenance been considered? 
 
15. Have service connections been provided in high-dose-rate areas for ready use (e.g., air, water, and 
electrical outlets), and are they appropriate for the equipment? 
 
16. Are isolation valves, pump motors, controls, grease fittings, removable shielding, etc., accessible in  
low-dose-rate areas or on the side of the wall for maintenance? 
 
17. Are screens provided on sump pump intakes to reduce the chance of failure caused by extraneous 
matter? 
 
18. Has provision been made to remotely move a frozen or entangled crane in a high-dose-rate area? 
 
19. Have shielded containers been designed for easy receipt of filters, sample bombs, rad waste, etc.? 
 
20. Is insulation marked to avoid unnecessary removal and for timely replacement? 
 
21. As applicable, has consideration been given to the use of robots or robotic machines? 
 
22. Are traffic patterns for maintenance, etc., such that movement in and out of radiological areas is 
efficient, with minimal crossing of paths? 
 
23. If shielding is not practical, can equipment be moved to a lower-dose-rate area for maintenance? 
 
24. Are the numbers of flow restrictions, vents, drains, pipe fittings, flanges, bends, and tees minimized 
to reduce radioactivity deposition? 
25. Is adequate pull, laydown, and working space provided? 
 
26. Are doorways and labyrinths wide enough to permit necessary personnel, component, and 
equipment passage? 
 
27. Are permanent platforms, scaffolds, walkways, stairs, or ladders provided to permit accessibility, or 
is the area roomy and low-dose enough for the ready creation of temporary access forms? 
 
28. Is space provided as appropriate for access areas with friskers, bins, or drums for protective 
clothing, etc.? 
 
29. Is equipment designed for ready removal, with lifting lugs, pad eyes, overhead lifting points, and 
sufficient clearances? 
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30. Are units that are frequently pulled out of their installed position for checking mounted on racks, 
slides, or hinges? 
 
31. Is a hinged door rather than a cover plate used where (human) physical access is required? If there 
is no space for a hinged opening, is a cover plate with captive quick-opening fasteners used? 
 
32. Is a window, guide-opening metal cover, mirror, etc., used for visual access? 
 
33. Are components arranged so that all throw-away parts are accessible without removing other 
components? 
 
34. Is proper lighting provided in the work area, and is emergency lighting provided as backup? 
 
35. Are functions, equipment, etc., clearly and permanently labeled or provided with secure 
explanatory tags, and do these correspond to notations on system diagrams? 
 
36. Have color-coding and alignment marking of equipment, systems, or areas been considered as 
appropriate? 
 
37. Are hatches and manways designed to allow suitably equipped and clothed workers visibility and 
maneuverability? 
 
38. Has consideration been given to the provision of lifelines to pull accidentally injured or 
unconscious workers from areas of high dose rates or high airborne activity? 
 
39. Are appropriate communications provided for in the area? 
 
40. Has sufficient speaker and siren coverage been provided so that all workers in radiological areas 
can be promptly alerted as to the hazards? 
 
41. Has consideration been given to Alaydown space@ for portable equipment and other items used in 
calibrations, inspections, etc.? 
 
42. Has consideration been given to human lifting capability in selecting equipment, temporary 
shielding, etc.? 
 
43. Has the wearing of protective clothing, respirators, etc., been considered in selecting equipment for 
or designing areas in which temperatures may be high when workers are present? 
 
44. Are special tools or equipment specific to one area provided and kept near the area?
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